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EmanuEla Scribano
QUOD NESCIS QUOMODO FIAT, ID NON FACIS.
OCCASIONALISM AGAINST DESCARTES?
abStract. – Post-Cartesian Occasionalism argues that the power of causing 
an effect depends on knowledge of the means by which the effect is produced. 
The argument is used to deny finite beings the power to act. Arnold Geulincx 
expresses this thesis in the principle Quod nescis quomodo fiat id non facis. Here, 
my purpose is to show that: 
1. The philosophical problem that is at the origin of the principle Quod nes-
cis quomodo fiat id non facis originates in Galen’s De foetuum formatione, a work 
translated into Latin only in 1535.
2. Important works of early modern philosophy, such as Campanella’s Del 
senso delle cose e della magia, discuss Galen’s text.
3. Due to their rejection of teleology, Descartes’ physics and metaphysics are 
completely foreign to the Quod nescis principle. Comparing the Cartesian theory 
of animal-machines with the theory of animal behavior of Pierre Chanet, a phi-
losopher who adopts the principle, confirms this claim.
1. The formulation of the principle
The formulation of the principle Quod nescis quomodo fiat id non facis 
is traditionally attributed to Arnold Geulincx.1 The principle appears for 
the first time in a physics dissertation written in 1663, and both Ethics 
(1665) and Metaphysica vera (published posthumously in 1691) state it.2 
The principle is included in a Cartesian context only in this last text: the 
title of the first chapter – or prima scientia, as Geulincx calls it –, is Cogito 
1 A. DE lattrE, L’Occasionalisme d’Arnold Geulincx, Paris 1967, pp. 365-412. 
2 A. GEulincx, Disputatio physica 3, in EiuSD. Opera Philosophica, 3 vols., recognovit J. 
P. N. lanD, The Hague 1891-93; Stuttgart 1968, II, pp. 502-503; ID., Ethica, First Treatise, 




ego sum; 3 the second chapter makes it clear that the nature of the Self 
is conscious thinking. Finally, the fourth chapter prepares for the formu-
lation of the principle, stressing that mind and body are heterogeneous: 
the Self has modes of thought that do not depend on the Self as res cogi-
tans – writes Geulincx – that is, all involuntary thoughts. These thoughts 
might depend on the body, but it is not clear how the body could cause 
these thoughts, in that «I don’t see in [the body] any proportion or power 
able to produce that effect».4 As we see, the first reason Geulincx offers 
to exclude that it is the body that causes involuntary thoughts, i. e. the 
lack of proportion between mind and body, is rather Cartesian.5 The fifth 
chapter, instead, leaves aside the dualist context and does not resort to 
the difference between mind and body to rule out that the body causes 
the mind to have involuntary thoughts: I myself do not trigger some 
thoughts, hence it must be someone else who does so, but this someone 
else «conscius esse debet hujus negotii; facit enim, et impossibile est, ut is 
faciat, qui nescit quomodo fiat».6 It is necessary to be aware of the means 
by which an effect is produced to be able to produce it. Hence from I’ll 
call this principle the ‘epistemic condition of causality’. 
Geulincx submits the epistemic condition of causality as a principle 
that doesn’t need a proof: «This is a principle very evident by itself».7 The 
following remarks reinforce the evidence of the principle, getting rid of 
prejudices that might have obscured it. When we correctly believe our-
selves unable to heat or make light, Geulincx remarks, we believe this 
because we do not know what to do in order to produce heat or light. 
For the same reason it is not admissible to attribute to the sun or fire the 
ability to heat or produce light, because neither the sun nor fire knows 
how to produce those effects: «Quod nescis quomodo fiat, id non facis».8 
3 GEulincx Opera Philosophica, cit., III, p. 147. 
4 Ibid., p. 150: «nihil in illo proportionis aut potentiae video ad negotium illud expe-
diendo».
5 To the lack of proportion between mind and body Geulincx adds that the body lacks the 
power (potentia) to produce these thoughts. The body’s lack of power was an argument gener-
ally stressed by the first Occasionalists. See Louis de La Forge, Traité de l’esprit de l’Homme, 
published in 1666, in L. DE la ForGE, Œuvres philosophiques, édition présentée par P. Clair, 
Paris 1974, pp. 237-238, and Gérauld de Cordemoy, Discernement du corps et de l’âme, pub-
lished also in 1666, in G. DE corDEmoy, Œuvres philosophiques, édition critique présentée par 
P. Clair et F. Girbal, Paris 1968, pp. 135 ss.
6 GEulincx, Metaphysica vera, cit., III, p. 150.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
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Thus, dropping the original Cartesian context, which is centered around 
mind-body causation, the principle Quod nescis quomodo fiat id non fa-
cis is held as if it were sound for any causal relation, even that of bodies 
among themselves, or of voluntary actions, as already stressed in Ethica,9 
justifying adherence to an extreme form of Occasionalism which traces 
back to God any effect produced in nature.
The principle, which Geulincx stated as evident, was met with great 
success. Malebranche adopted it, adding the principle to the main argu-
ments barring causality among finite beings.10 The Quod nescis principle 
even became the main if not sole argument to which Pierre Bayle resorted 
in order to justify Occasionalism, setting aside all the arguments produced 
in their day by Louis de La Forge and Géraud de Cordemoy.11
Since in Metaphysica vera Geulincx framed the principle Quod nescis 
in a Cartesian context, its origin has been frequently located in Cartesian 
philosophy.12 Here, I will suggest a completely different hypothesis.
9 See the first Treatise of Ethica II, II, 4-8, and the corresponding Annotationes 38-42 
(GEulincx Opera Philosophica, cit., III, pp. 30-37 and 203-222). 
10 N. MalEbranchE, La recherche de la vérité VI, II, III, in ID., Oeuvres completes, éd. 
par A. RobinEt, Paris 1958-76 (OC), II, pp. 315-316, cit. infra p. 000; ID., Eclaircissement 
XV, in OC, III, p. 226: «Je voi même tres-clairement, qu’il ne peut y avoir de rapport entre 
la volonté que j’ai de remuer le bras, et entre l’agitation des esprits animaux, c’est à dire, de 
quelques petits corps, dont je ne sçai ni le mouvement ni la figure; lesquels vont choisir cer-
tains canaux des nerfs entre un million d’autres que je ne connois pas, afin de causer en moi 
le mouvement que je souhaite par une infinité de mouvemens que je ne souhaite point»; ID., 
Méditations chrétiennes, in OC, X, p. 62: «Peut-on faire, peut-on même vouloir ce qu’on ne 
sçait point faire?»; ID., Entretiens sur la métaphysique et sur la religion, in OC, XII-XIII, p. 
167: «Je ne sçai pas même quelles doivent être les dispositions des organes qui servent à la 
voix pour prononcer ce que je vous dis sans hésiter». However, there is no certain evidence 
that Malebranche knew the texts of Geulincx in which the principle is contained, at least at 
the time of the first appearance of the principle in Malebranche’s works, i. e. in the first edi-
tion of the La recherche de la vérité. 
11 S. NaDlEr, The occasionalism of Louis de La Forge, in ID., Occasionalism, Oxford-New 
York 2011, pp. 105-122. On Bayle and the Quod nescis principle see G. mori, Bayle philoso-
phe, Paris 1999, pp. 92-96.
12 On the Cartesian origin of the principle, see M. GuEroult, Malebranche, 3 vols., Paris 
1955-59, II, p. 224, and especially DE lattrE, L’Occasionalism d’Arnold Geulincx, cit., pp. 345 
ss. See also V. NicuSanti, L’opera di Arnold Geulincx. Tra cartesianesimo e occasionalismo, 2007 
http://www.uniurb.it/Filosofia/isonomia/. A non-Cartesian origin of the principle is proposed 
by S. NaDlEr, Knowledge, Volitional Agency and Causation in Malebranche and Geulincx, in 
ID., Occasionalism, cit., pp. 74-87. Nadler draws attention to the medieval Arabic theologians 
who identified causality with a volitional and intelligent agency. However, Nadler does not 
claim that Geulincx or Malebranche had direct knowledge of these philosophers. Moreover, 
in the texts cited by Nadler, these philosophers maintain knowledge of the effect as a condi-
tion of causality, but they do not require knowledge of the means by which the effect is pro-
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2. At the origin of the principle
Arguing for the Quod nescis principle, Malebranche points up the 
anatomical details barring the possibility that the will could have a causal 
effect on the body. Since in order to move a part of our body we are re-
quired to command many muscles and nerves, unknown even to the most 
refined anatomist, it is impossible for the mind to be able to perform any 
movement of the body: 
For how could we move our arms? To move them, it is necessary to have 
animal spirits, to send them through certain nerves toward certain muscles in 
order to inflate and contract them, for it is thus that the arm attached to them 
is moved […]. And we see men who do not know that they have spirits, nerves, 
and muscles move their arms, and even move them with more skill and ease than 
those who know anatomy best. Therefore, men will to move their arms, and only 
God is able and knows how to move them […] there is no man who knows what 
must be done to move one of his fingers by means of animal spirits. How, then, 
could men move their arms? 13
Geulincx already stressed the complexity of human body, arguing for 
the impossibility for the mind to know human body’s mechanism, and by 
consequence, to cause body movements:
With what impudence will I dare say that I cause something that I do not 
know how to do? I do not know how, by what nerves and through which chan-
nels this motion is to be communicated from the brain into my limbs; I do not 
even know how it has come into the brain itself, nor even if it is there.14 
duced. And the knowledge of the means is exactly what the principle Quod nescis imposes as 
a condition for causality.
13 MalEbranchE, La recherche de la vérité VI, II, III, in OC, II, p. 315; ID., The Search 
After Truth, translated by Th. m. lEnnon and P. J. olScamp, Columbus 1980, pp. 449-450. 
Only in Eclaircissement XV (1712) does Malebranche stress the fact that a finite cause like 
human will cannot know and cause the movement of a number of infinite bodies. See Mal-
EbranchE, Eclaircissement XV, cit., p. 228. In all precedent texts Malebranche was satisfied to 
stress the great number of body parts involved in the smallest movement. Therefore, the im-
possibility for a finite cause to know an infinite number of muscles, nerves etc. is only a late 
remark and it is not a necessary condition for assuming the Quod nescis principle. Stressing 
the infinite number of muscles, nerves etc. Malebranche strengthens the Quod nescis principle 
with his favorite epistemological argument, which denies the possibility of knowing the infi-
nite through the finite. 
14 GEulincx, Ethica, cit., p. 32 (I, II, II, 4). See also P. BaylE, Système abrégé de philoso-
phie, La physique, in ID., Oeuvres diverses, IV, Hildesheim 1968, p. 462a: «l’ame à la vérité 
n’est pas la cause physique de ce mouvement […] puisque pour remuer le bras, il faut plus 
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The emphasis on anatomical details is a helpful guide in searching for 
the starting point of the argument on which the Quod nescis principle was 
based. Following this guide, I suggest that we take a look at the author 
who, in antiquity, planned the development of anatomical studies of the 
human body, i. e. Galen.15 As we will see, Galen’s work is closer in time 
to Geulincx, Malebranche and Bayle than we might imagine.
As is well known, Galen was, even in relation to Aristotle, proud of 
his contribution to advances in the practice of dissecting animals, as well 
as to knowledge of animal and human anatomies. The anatomical knowl-
edge he gathered influenced the challenge Galen posed to philosophers 
in a short text on the formation of the fetus, De foetuum formatione.16 
Galen looks at embryology as a new and more problematic frontier for ex-
plaining natural phenomena. Galen shows great contempt for those who, 
responding to the difficult questions posed by embriology, appeal generi-
cally to ‘nature’. This word, according to Galen, does not express a clear 
concept: «[philosophers] retained it unnecessary, after having stated that 
the fetus is formed by nature, to put forth anything more than that term 
commonly known to everybody».17 However, it is not only the fetus for-
mation to look a difficult problem for science and philosophy. Also trivial 
animal bodies’ movements seem equally mysterious. And Galen refers to 
everyone’s experience to call due attention to the complexity of the more 
common events in nature. In fact, in a few pages, the problem of a satis-
d’art que l’ame n’en peut avoir sans une longue etude»; and ID., Réponse aux questions d’un 
provincial, in ibid., III, Hildesheim 1966, p. 786b.
15 As far as I know, Georges Canguilhem has been the only scholar who noticed the close 
resemblance between Galen and Malebranche. The remark by Canguilhem has, however, been 
neglected by Occasionalism scholars. See G. canGuilhEm, La formation du concept de réflexe 
aux XVII e et XVIII e siècles, Paris 1955, p. 17: «Dans le chapitre VI du De foetuum formatione 
libellus, Galien est conduit à traiter de la motion du corps par l’âme. La difficulté est d’expli-
quer comment l’âme intelligente peut mouvoir le corps d’après la connoissance des organes et 
de leurs functions, ce qui revient à supposer dans l’âme du premier venu une connaissance ana-
tomique et physiologique bien supérieure à celle des meilleurs anatomistes qui savent à peine, 
d’après des dissections, la fonction propre de chacun des muscles. Cet argument traversera les 
siècles et on le retrouvera, inchangé, chez Malebranche à l’appui de la thèse que seul le Créateur 
des corps peut et sait en être le Moteur». I owe this reference to Andrea Sangiacomo. 
16 ClauDio GalEno, De foetuum formatione, edidit, in linguam germanicam vertit, com-
mentatus est D. NickEl, Berlin 2001. Latin text in clauDii GalEni Opera Omnia, editionem 
curavit D. caroluS Gottlob kühn, Tomus IV, Lipsiae, literis Frider. Chr. Dürrii 1822, pp. 
652-702. 
17 Ibid., pp. 90-92; ed. Kühn, p. 687: «[…] si a natura foetum formari dicant, nihil sane 
se amplius quam nomen omnibus consuetum dixisse. Nemo enim tam stolidus est, ut non in-




factory explanation of fetus formation becomes only one case of a much 
broader problem involving accounting, in general, for body movements 
and, in particular, for voluntary ones. Galen attributes to backwardness 
in the field of anatomy on the part of the philosophers who preceded 
him the fact that no one had wondered why 
not only we, but even newborn babies and children, when asked to open or 
close a finger, do it immediately, without knowing which muscle moves the fin-
ger […] everybody thinks it is marvelous that a young boy, as soon as he hears 
the word ‘bread’, repeats it without knowing how the tongue is to be placed nor 
which muscles make it perform the different movements. […] It is extremely hard 
to explain why, whenever we want to move a limb in any way, it immediately 
moves, although we do not know what muscle makes it move […].18 
Ignorance of anatomy once precluded wondering about these events, 
and asking how it is possible to move a limb without any knowledge of 
muscles, tendons and their workings. But Galen’s researches revealed 
the extraordinary complexity of the body, and dramatically posed the 
question of how it is possible to move one part of the body, ignoring 
the plenty of muscles and nerves necessary to produce this effect. The 
emphasis on the multiplicity of muscles involved in animal body move-
ment that we have seen in Geulincx and in Malebranche was already in 
Galen, who stressed this fact glorifying the wisdom of the artificer who 
planned animal bodies: 
In an animal body there are more than three hundred muscles, which moves 
the limbs following the will […]. But, if we carefully look at the structure of 
18 Ibid., pp. 94-96; ed. Kühn, pp. 689-693: «Proponatur primum manus, quae omnes digitos 
tribus ossibus compositos atque inter se articulis commissos habet; in quibus nimirum primum 
exerceri satius esset illos, qui coelum ac mundum universum erant contemplaturi, quomodo sci-
licet sint fabbricati, quibusque instrumentis motus ipsis accederet; quomodo aliquando articu-
lis vel simul omnibus vel privatim singulis extenderentur, aliquando in latus flecterentur, idque 
dupliciter, vel ad parvum vel ad magnum digitum. Si enim novissent per musculos omnes hos 
motus fieri, nobis ignorantibus, priusquam per dissectionem in conspectum venissent, admira-
ti sane essent, quomodo non solum nos, sed parvuli etiam infantes, quum aliquem digitum vel 
estendere vel inflectere jubentur, statim id faciant, licet moventem musculum non cognoscant. 
Quod in lingua magis adhuc mirabile est, de cujus musculorum numero inter anatomicos non 
convenit; tantum abest, ut eos, qui singulis motionibus praesunt, certo cognoscant […]. Mirum 
autem illud omnes putant, parvum puerulum, ubi audiverit hanc vocem, panis, quum neque quo-
modo lingua figuretur cognoscat, neque a quibus musculis ad singulas vocum motiones agatur, eam, 
imo tutum etiam deiceps versum esprimere; in qua re lingua multas mutationes singulis vocibus 
accomodatas moliatur. […] Cur, ubi partem aliquam movere voluerimus quocunque modo, ea 
statim moveatur, licet moventem musculum non agnoscamus, longe difficillimum est; vix enim ex 
dissectione anatomicis propria uniuscuiusque muscoli functio inventa est» (Emphasis mine).
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the three hundred [muscles], each of which attains at ten goals, we arrive at the 
number of three thousands […] and if someone would like to number the goals 
of each structure, those that have attained the highest perfection will attain the 
number of ten thousands, not thousand, which, as I have said, I cannot believe 
not to be the work of a very wise and powerful author.19
Facing such ordinary and mysterious phaenomena, as appropriately 
moving the many tongue muscles, for example, so as to utter a word, 
which any child can easily do, or to bend a finger, as Malebranche will 
repeat, Galen surveys the conjectures which have been or could be ad-
vanced on the subject. The gods could have initially endowed bodies 
with movement without any further intervention; the world, as the hu-
man body, could be directed by a soul; each of the many moving muscles 
could be an animal wisely obeying the orders of human will. All these con-
jectures are carefully reviewed, and, as each one encounter insurmount-
able difficulties, Galen discards all of them. It would seem impossible 
for each muscle to be an animal, given the numerous variety of muscles 
which uttering a single word requires.20 Nor is it conceivable that a sin-
gle soul form and govern our limbs: «The soul that rules us seems not 
to have knowledge of the parts which obey its stimuli, which is evidence 
against that view».21 Finally, the hypothesis of an intelligent god who 
19 Ibid., pp. 96-98; ed. Kühn, pp. 693-695: «in animalis corpore muscoli sunt multo plu-
res quam trecenti illi, qui pro voluntate partes movent […]. Attamen, si trecentarum partium 
structurae, singulae decem scopos obtinentes, in totum sint absolutae, ad trium millium nu-
merum omnes evadent. […] si quis scopos uniuscuiusque structurae numerare velit, numerus 
omnium integre absolutorum, in dena millia, non millia, redigatur, quos ego nequaquam, ut 
dixi, nisi a sapientissimo ac potentissimo opifice factos esse crediderim».
20 Ibid., p. 96; ed. Kühn, pp. 690-691: «Quidam fuit, qui dixit, unumquemque musculum 
quasi animal voluntatem nostram persentientem attrahere ac circumducere linguam in conve-
nientem figuram ad vocem exprimendam; atque hoc omnibus aliis probabile minime videtur. 
[…] Caeterum quum plures quam trecenti musculi in nobis sint, non est sane credendum, 
unumquemque ex ipsis animal esse».
21 Ibid., p. 100; ed. Kühn, pp. 696-697: «Nam quum puerulos videamus sonare, quaecunque 
eos jusserimus, verbi gratia smyrnam, scalpellum, smegma, neque tamen musculos, qui linguam 
commode, ut haec vox exigit, movent, multo minus etiam nervos cognoscere, maxi me probabile 
existimo esse, illum, qui linguam nostram finxit, quicunque is fuerit, vel ipsum adhuc in formatis 
partibus permanere, vel partes ipsas animantia constituisse, quae voluntatem principis partis ani-
mae nostrae cognoscerent. […] Quum enim audio, quosdam philosophos dicere, materiam ani-
matam, quae ab aeterno est, in ideas respiciendo se ipsam exornare, magis adhuc intelligo, unam 
oportere esse animam, quae et nos formet, et quae singulis particulis nunc utatur. Huic autem 
opinioni adversatur, quod, quae nos regit anima, appetitionibus ipius inservientes partes ignoret». 
And pp. 692-693: «Sed cur, ubi partem aliquam movere voluerimus quocunque modo, ea statim 
moveatur, licet moventem musculum non agnoscamus, longe difficillimum est; vix enim ex dissec-
tione anatomicis propria uniuscuiusque musculi functio inventa est» (Emphasis mine).
Emanuela Scribano
~ 8 ~
first endowed the world with physical movement and then lost interest 
in its workings suggests, for Galen, a magical transmission of movement, 
and hence has no place in science. Moreover, this conjecture ascribes an 
irrational cause to the transmission of movement, returning to the Epi-
curean hypothesis of a casual origin of life and of the order of nature, 
which is the hypothesis that Galen intended, first and foremost, to reject, 
agreeing here with both Plato and Aristotle.22 Galen concludes aporeti-
cally: philosophers have been unable to answer his questions, but the 
problem has been posed. Finding the cause of the simplest body move-
ments requires individuating an intelligent cause which knows how these 
movements are effected, and this intelligence is lacking in the mind of a 
little boy who utters the word ‘bread’ moving a prodigious quantity of 
muscles.23
Let us come back to the reason through which Galen discards the 
conjecture that one single soul could form and move the human body: 
«The soul that rules us seems not to have knowledge of the parts which 
obey its stimuli, which is evidence against that view». It seems impossible 
to Galen that a being who has no knowledge of the means by which a 
part of his body moves, can be able to move it. Voluntary movements, 
however, are only an example, chosen for its evidence, of how difficult it 
is to find the cause of movements in a living body, as the case of fetus’ for-
mation shows. If Galen does not have an answer to the question of what 
cause a living body movements, he is at least persuaded that no available 
philosophical conjecture yield knowledge of the means that produce the 
movements. Indeed, knowledge of these means is a necessary condition 
of this kind of causality. 
As Geulincx, Galen doesn’t explain why the epistemic condition of 
causality looks so evident to him. This condition is at work in raising a 
problem and discarding some solutions, but is never justified. Why, we 
wonder, is the epistemic condition so evident to Galen?
22 Ibid., p. 92; ed. Kühn, pp. 688-689: «Atqui necessarium est, aut ex motu quodam ir-
rationali et inartificioso foetuum formationem optimum finem consequi, aut, quemadmodum 
qui miracula moliuntur, ubi motus initium ipsis exhibuerint, ipsi quidem discedunt, opificia 
vero ipsa ac machinae aliquousque non multo tempore artificiose moventur, ita etiam deos, 
postquam stirpium animaliumque semina in tantam motuum successionem idonea praepararint, 
nihil praeterea ipsos agere. […] Quemadmodum enim optimum est nusquam in tanta partium 
copia casu delinquere, ita etiam artificiosam motus consequentiam ab irrationali quadam fieri 
substantia, quemadmodum ipsi dicunt, affermare temerarium est».
23 Ibid., p. 96; ed. Kühn, pp. 690-691. See supra note 18.
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The answer to the question lies in the metaphysical framework of Ga-
len’s work. Galen was not only a great anatomist; he was also the author 
of an ambitious philosophical project, aiming at merging Aristotelian bi-
ology with Platonic metaphysics, introducing or rather reintroducing an 
intelligent mind, a demiurge, to account for the order of nature. The dia-
logue with Aristotle, and in particular with his biological writings, is the 
framework of the questions Galen raises in his embryological essay. As a 
matter of fact, Galen rewrote the Aristotelian On the Parts of Animals in 
his great opus De usu partium, a work whose conceptual core is evident 
in its very title, assuming, as a central point of biology, the Aristotelian 
thesis according to which the aim of parts is their function, i. e., their use. 
But Galen uses for an anti-Aristotelian goal the aim of animal limbs, of 
which Aristotle availed himself for explaining their structure. For Aris-
totle, the functions of animal limbs were the best proof of the capability 
of nature to organize itself without an intelligent mind planning natural 
order.24 On the contrary, Galen refers to the functioning of animal parts 
as evidence of an intelligent architect of nature. Galen closes his work 
with the famous Epode, showing physics and biology to be the best pro-
paedeutics for theology. Indeed, according to Galen, the order of nature 
points everywhere to the presence of an ordering intelligence.
This metaphysical framework explains Galen’s requirement of know-
ing the mechanisms of animal body in order to be able to produce a 
movement in it. However, the text on the formation of the fetus has its 
own specificity into the general claim of an intelligent mind in nature. In 
the De usu partium, Galen appeals to an intelligent artificer for biological 
phenomena with an end – that is, for the functioning of organs in living 
beings. In De foetuum formatione, Galen confirms, as we saw above, the 
request for an intelligent artificer of animal bodies, due to the complex-
ity of goals performed by each limb, but he goes a step farther, looking 
for an intelligent and conscious cause of any body movement, voluntary 
ones included, no matter the goal of that movement. Galen deems the 
knowledge of the means to be a condition of the efficient causality of the 
movement of a limb. 
24 See M. C. nuSSbaum, Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium, text with translation, commentary 
and interpretative essays, Princeton 1978, pp. 70-74. See also D. Quarantotto, Causa finale, 
sostanza, essenza in Aristotele. Saggio sulla struttura dei processi teleologici e sulla funzione del 




If the problem raised in the embryological essay by Galen is at the 
origin of the principle Quod nescis formulated by Geulincx, one wonders 
what happened of it in the many centuries that elapsed between Galen 
and Geulincx. This is a pertinent question, because, as we have seen, 
Galen resorted to the epistemic condition of causality in looking for an 
intelligent cause of natural order, and the quest for an intelligent cause 
of natural order is largely present even in those Scholastic philosophers 
whose investigation of nature was inspired by Aristotle. The most obvi-
ous case is Aquinas. Before Aquinas, his teacher, Albert the Great, didn’t 
perceive any difficulty in attributing Aristotle the saying Opus naturae est 
opus intelligentiae.25 Albert formulates this saying for the first time in De 
animalibus, and precisely in book 16, chapter 7, where Albert summa-
rizes Aristotle’s theory about generation and development of embryos.26 
As happened in Galen, embryology is the ideal context for an appeal to 
an intelligence in explaining natural phaenomena.
Not far from Albert is Aquinas. The analysis of nature, by Aquinas, 
assumes Aristotelian categories, but it leads to divine intelligence, as in 
Plato. This transformation of Aristotelian physics implied the refusal of 
the basic claim on which Aristotle centered the autonomy of nature from 
God, i. e. the claim according to which aiming at a goal, in nature, doesn’t 
imply an intelligent and conscious mind.27 Typically Aquinas, in his fifth 
way of proving that God exists, shows that He exists moving from the 
claim that natural beings with no intelligence act with a goal. Since there 
are no final causes without conscious understanding, the behaviour of 
natural beings with no intelligence indicates that there is an intelligent 
mind directing nature, like the archer aiming his arrow.28 Natural order 
25 On the history of this interpretation of Aristotle that dates back to Themistius, see S. 
LanDucci, I filosofi e Dio, Roma-Bari 2005, pp. 17 ss.
26 See J. A. WEiShEipl, The Axiom ‘Opus naturae est Opus Intelligentiae’ and Its Origins, 
in Albertus Magnus doctor universalis. 1280-1980, ed. by G. MEyEr and A. ZimmErmann, Mainz 
1980, pp. 441-463. 
27 AriStotlE, Physics II, 8, 199b 26-30: «It is absurd to suppose that purpose is not present 
because we do not observe the agent deliberating. Art does not deliberate. If the ship-building 
art were in the wood, it would produce the same results by nature. If, therefore, purpose is 
present in art, it is present also in nature. The best illustration is a doctor doctoring himself: 
nature is like that».
28 thomaS aquinaS, Summa theologiae I, qu. 2, a. 3, in c.: «Videmus […] quod aliqua 
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was therefore traced back to an external agent, risking the reduction 
of all natural phenomena to instruments, like the arrows in the archer’s 
hands.29
Nevertheless, Aquinas’ argument is strictly limited to natural beings 
without intelligence. A human being, endowed with reason, is able to set 
goals, and hence does not risk being likened to an arrow – at least not by 
this argument. Admittedly, human actions also risk being removed from 
human causation in Aquinas; here the loss of causality, for human beings, 
is due to divine concursus.30 In this case, however, there is no appeal to the 
need for an intelligent mind, but to a power able to preserve the being of 
creatures. Instead, the specificity of Galen’s question posed in De foetuum 
formatione was its reference, first of all, to intelligent beings conscious of 
their ignorance of the means by which an effect is produced. 
In any case, it did not occur to Aquinas, nor to Albert before him, to 
appeal to intelligence to account for how it is possible to raise an arm at 
will. Neither Albert nor Aquinas thought that efficient causality needed 
knowledge of the means which produce an effect. In any case, neither 
Albert nor Aquinas could have been urged in this direction by the em-
bryological text by Galen, because they did not have access to Galen’s 
De foetuum formatione, which was still to remain inaccessible for centu-
ries. Thanks to Diethard Nickel, author of the critical edition of De foe-
tuum formatione, we know that this short text had not been translated 
into either Persian or Syriac. Hence, when first Arabic and later Latin 
translations of the Persian and Syriac codices of Galen’s work became 
available in Europe between the twelfth and the fourteenth centuries, 
the De foetuum formatione of course was not included. The first Latin 
versions of the De foetuum formatione, rendering the Greek manuscripts 
que cognitione carent, scilicet corpora naturalia, operantur propter finem […]. Ea quae non 
habent cognitionem, non tendunt in finem nisi directa ab aliquo cognoscente et intelligente, 
sicut sagitta a sagittante. Ergo est aliquid intelligens, a quo omnes res naturals ordinantur ad 
finem: et hoc dicimus Deum».
29 thomaS aquinaS, De veritate qu. 22, a. 2 ad 9: «in omni dirigente in finem requiritur 
cognitio finis, natura autem non dirigit in finem sed dirigitur: Deus autem et agens a propo-
sito quodlibet etiam dirigunt in finem; et ideo oportet quod habeant finis cognitionem, non 
autem res naturalis».
30 See A. J. FrEDDoSo, God’s General Concurrence with Secondare Causes: Pitfalls and Pros-
pects, «American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly», LXVIII, 1994, pp. 131-156, and iD., God’s 
general Concurrence with Secondare Causes: Why Conservation Is not Enough, «Philosophical 
Perspectives», V, 1991, pp. 553-585. On Malebranche and continuous creation see S. lEE, Nec-
essary Connection and Continuous Creation. Malebranche’s Two Arguments for Occasionalism, 
«Journal of the History of Philosophy», XLVI, 2008, pp. 538-618.
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(presently conserved in Florence, Venice and Paris) are those prepared 
by the humanists and dating from 1535-1536, on the basis of editio prin-
ceps of Greek texts (1525).31 Therefore, it was only at the beginning of 
the modern era that Galen’s text entered the philosophical debate, which 
it soon influenced. Establishing a link between causality and knowledge 
of the means by which effects are produced, Galen forced philosophi-
cal debate to examine the problem that Geulincx would express in the 
Quod nescis principle. 
The same is true of the consequences, which are presumed to be mod-
ern too, of the principle formulated by Geulincx in 1663. In fact, follow-
ing the logic of his reflections on the mysteries of living body movements, 
Galen also met the converse of Quod nescis, i. e. the principle that Vico 
will call the ‘Verum factum’. According to the Verum factum principle, 
only those who cause an effect have real knowledge of it. The idea this 
principle expresses appears in Galen’s text, in reflecting on the link be-
tween causality and knowledge: «This seems to signify that, using these 
parts, the soul knows their use as if it itself built them, and not as if it 
used them as built by someone else».32 The supposed modernity of the 
Quod nescis and Verum factum principles is due only to the circumstance 
that Galen’s text on the formation of the fetus entered philosophical de-
bate in the middle of the sixteenth century.
Let us draw some first conclusions: the problem raised by Galen in 
his embryological text is ineffective until the half of the XVI century. The 
philosophical context at the origin of the problem raised by Galen, i. e. 
the need of an intelligence for explaining natural order, had produced 
important consequences before, but they were circumscribed to behav-
ior, supposed aiming at a goal, of non intelligent beings. Human beings, 
qua endowed with intelligence, were excluded by this analysis. In Galen’s 
embryological essay, the epistemic condition of causality concerns mainly 
human body movements. When Geulincx formulates and Malebranche 
assumes the principle Quod nescis, human actions are the first to need a 
foreign and intelligent cause, expanding the epistemic condition to any 
cause-effect relation. 
31 See D. NickEl, Einleitung to GalEno, De foetuum formatione, cit., pp. 38-39.
32 GalEno, De foetuum formatione, cit., p. 96; ed. Kühn, p. 692: «Haec omnia videtur si-
gnificare, animam, quae partibus his utitur, ipsarum usum cognoscere, quasi ipsa eas fabricavit, 
non ab alio fabricatis utatur».
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4. The Campanella case
Even if the problem raised by Galen in De foetuum formatione en-
ters the philosophical debate only in the half of XVI Century, it is worth 
asking what happened in the more than one hundred years between the 
modern edition of the Galenic text and the formulation of the principle 
Quod nescis by Geulincx. If we could verify that the problem raised by 
Galen, silent before 1535, had some echoes between 1535 and 1663, this 
will strongly support the hypothesis that the epistemic problem about 
causality has its origin in Galen’s text.
In fact, the problem raised by Galen emerges in a text by Tommaso 
Campanella, Del senso delle cose e della magia, first published in Latin 
translation in 1620.33 This text, as its title indicates, is dedicated to claim-
ing on behalf of nature sensibility and a form of knowledge, as opposed 
to all philosophical doctrines which found nature lacking knowledge and 
therefore ineffective.
Campanella deems obvious the thesis according to which where 
there is finality there must be knowledge of the goal. Explicitly disput-
ing Aquinas and scholasticism, Campanella draws the conclusion that na-
ture, whose action aims at a goal, is endowed with sensibility and a form 
of knowledge: «Nature knows its goal, because it would neither act nor 
direct its work toward its goal, if it did not know it. Therefore, instinct 
is the impulse of a knowing nature».34 Every being knows what is good 
for its nature and aims at it, as fire aims upwards. Unlike the arrow, na-
ture knows the goal it aims at. Whoever denies this would not be able to 
distinguish natural from violent movement.
In Del senso delle cose Campanella critically cites Galen’s text on the 
formation of the fetus.35 Campanella cannot agree with Galen, because the 
33 On the history of Campanella’s text see G. ErnSt, Nota al testo, in T. campanElla, Del 
senso delle cose e della magia, a cura di G. ErnSt, Roma-Bari 2007.
34 CampanElla, Del senso delle cose e della magia, cit., p. 17: «Dunque la natura conosce 
il fine, perché non ageria né indrizzeria a quello l’opere sue, se non lo conoscesse. Dunque 
l’istinto è impulso di conoscente natura». Campanella deems so evident the link between aim-
ing at a goal and having knowledge of it that he attributes this opinion to Aristotle himself, 
following the interpretation of Aristotle already pursued by Albert the Great. Ibid. 
35 Ibid., I, ch. 3. Galen’s work on the fetus is also discussed in StEphani roDErci caStrEn-
SiS De Meteoris microcosmi Libri Quatuor, Florentiae, Apud Iunctas 1621, pp. 4 ss. Roderigo 
De Castro’s text is discussed by M. MErSEnnE, L’impiété des déistes, éd. par D. DEScotES, Paris 
2005, pp. 607 ss. Moreover, Mersenne, criticizing Campanella’s De sensu rerum, directly quotes 
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Greek physician, following Plato, looked for the origin of the complex ar-
rangement of the body not in nature but in a world soul or in an architect 
of nature. In fact, Campanella includes the author of De foetuum forma-
tione in a long list of authors who, in order to explain natural phenomena, 
resort to an intelligence not pertaining to the essence of nature:
Someone says that angels make these works […] and Themistius with other 
Peripatetics resorts to a non wandering intelligence. Alexander and Avicenna 
seem to say the same as Anaxagoras, and, in De formatione foetus, Galen won-
ders about this mind, and ascribes it the making of animals, as Platonics resort 
to the world soul. Basil and Augustine agree. A plenty of theologians attribute 
it to the first Wisdom, who continually acts.36 
In the list, which includes the text by Galen, appears also the theo-
logian Gabriel Biel with his hard interpretation of divine concursus: «the 
theologian Gabriel holds the same principle (i. e. the acting on nature of 
a foreign mind) when he says that it is not the sun who shines, but God 
in the sun; neither is the man who speaks, but God in the man; neither 
is the fire which moves, but God in the fire».37 Campanella sees a family 
resemblance between the questions raised in the embryological text by 
Galen and the extreme theories of divine concursus, which remove any 
efficacy from natural beings. 
In the following chapter, Campanella analyzes a more moderate opin-
ion, which he attributes to Aquinas. According to this opinion, God has 
endowed beings with a natural instinct, which causes their actions. This 
opinion could be considered closer to truth, but if this instinct is a move-
ment impressed by God himself and not a power inherent in natural 
forms and endowed with knowledge, this opinion does not differ from the 
former one, and, like the former, it reduces natural beings to «tools […] 
driven to any action».38 Campanella suspects that this is Aquinas’ case.
Galen’s De foetuum formatione. Cfr. M. MErSEnnE, Quaestiones celeberrimae in Genesim, Lu-
tetiae Parisiorum, Sumptibus Sebastiani Cramoisy 1623, p. 940b.
36 CampanElla, Del senso delle cose e della magia, cit., p. 14: «Altri dicono che queste 
opere sono fatte dagli angeli […] e Temistio con altri Peripatetici all’intelligenza non errante 
corrono. Alessandro e Avicenna par che dicano l’istesso con Anassagora, e Galeno, De forma-
tione foetus, s’ammira di questa mente e a lei dona la formazione dgli animali, come i Plato-
nici ricorrono all’anima del mondo. E Basilio e Agostino applaudeno. Molti teologi alla prima 
Sapienza, che opera sempre, l’attribuiscono».
37 Ibid.: «Gabriel teologo al medesimo s’appiglia quando dice che non il sole luce, ma Dio 
nel sole; né l’uomo parla, ma Iddio nell’uomo; né si muove il fuoco, ma Iddio nel fuoco».
38 Ibid., p. 18: «instrumenti […] ad ogni atto indirizzati».
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Against Galen, against the concursus theory by Gabriel Biel, but also 
against the opinion apparently more moderate by Aquinas, Campanella 
holds that God does not draw nature towards a goal, but gives it the 
capacity of aiming on its own. Having this ability, nature has also been 
endowed by God with knowledge of how to reach the goal at which it 
aims: «God […] does not draw nature towards a goal but endows na-
ture with the ability to reach a goal as well as knowledge of how to reach 
it, otherwise God would be identical to us, because we, unable to give 
virtue to an arrow, endow it with violence, a violence which lasts very 
briefly and destroys the arrow».39 But the weapon used against Galen 
retorts against Campanella himself. In fact, if Campanella disagrees with 
Galen in attributing natural beings a knowledge of their goals, he does 
agree with him and, in general, with the philosophers who resorted to a 
divine mind for explaining natural order, on the principle that any final 
cause implies knowledge. Sharing this principle, Campanella, in the sec-
ond book of Del senso delle cose, meets with the problem the De foetuum 
formatione raised, i. e. that the knowledge of the means which produce an 
effect is a condition for causality in living bodies and especially in human 
ones.
Remembering the strong rejection of scholastic theories of concursus 
and divine direction of natural beings to a goal, the turn in chapter 26 of 
the second book is amazing, already in the title: Every thing is and acts 
as a tool of the first cause. ‘Tool’ is exactly the word used by Campanella 
in rejecting Aquinas, who, in his view, reduced creatures to «tools […] 
driven to any action». According to Campanella, each being strives for 
self-conservation, which is «the supreme good of every thing» and this 
is true for stones as for vegetables and animals. Just when Campanella 
focuses his attention on animals, he refers to De usu partium, where Ga-
len describes the extraordinary complexity of animal body by which each 
animal is capable of reaching his own conservation. This same complex-
ity imposes to refer to God or to a divine soul who guides animal bod-
ies: «because who doesn’t understand an enterprise, is not able to direct 
it».40 Moreover, the complexity of the human body raises another ques-
39 Campanella, Del senso delle cose e della magia, cit., p. 18: «Dio […] non tira al fine 
se non con l’istesse nature, imprimendo virtù, non solo d’andare al fine, ma di saper andare, 
altrimenti saria Dio eguale a noi che, per non poter dar virtù alla saetta, le doniamo violenza 
che dura pochissimo, e struggemo la saetta» (Emphasis mine).
40 Ibid., p. 98: «[N]non può reggere un magistero chi non l’intende».
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tion: how is it possible that this body is moved by a mind which doesn’t 
know the means that produce the movements?
I am amazed at the ingenuity of the human being, whose soul governs the 
body without knowing how it does so. In us, there are so many concoctions, sepa-
rations, aggregations, nutritions, gatherings and we are unable to understand how 
we do them. Yet we who are souls perform these acts, without knowing how to 
create a body with such grace, and even after studying so much anatomy we do 
not understand it […]. We ignore ourselves the constitution of our body and its 
management, because we don’t know how we move it, whether in the nerves there 
is a spirit or a faculty from which the movement originate, how we laugh and cry 
and think, because there are so many open questions concerning all this. As a con-
sequence, we are obliged to say that someone else guides us in constituting our body, 
as someone else guides the animal and vegetable soul, and that each soul is within 
the body, blind and in the dark, so that it sees neither itself nor its works.41 
Galen’s problem imposes itself dramatically on Campanella, and it 
breaks the certainties about the autonomy of nature boldly opposed to 
the same Galen in the first book of Del senso delle cose. Knowledge of 
the goal is not sufficient for attributing a being the capability to act aim-
ing at it, as Campanella argued in the first book. Now Campanella, as 
Galen, pretends that the knowledge of the means which produce an ef-
fect is necessary for accounting for that ability. That is why Campanella 
goes back to the necessity of a divine mind acting in nature. This mind 
is endowed of the knowledge lacking to the soul of men, animals and 
vegetables, and natural beings are to be considered its ‘tools’:
For sure the first Wisdom, the mind supreme of every thing, is eminently 
inside everything, and everything is in it; not moving, it is fastest, it walks from 
one end to another, and it does everything as the principal agent, and any other 
agent is a tool of his.42 
41 Ibid., pp. 98-99: «Io mi stupisco che l’uomo ha tanto ingegno, e l’anima sua regge il 
corpo, e pur non sa come lo regga. Si fanno in noi tante concozioni, separazioni, aggregazioni, 
nutrizioni, assembramenti, e non potemo intendere come le facciamo. E pure noi che siamo 
anima facciamo questi atti, né possiamo saper fabbricare un corpo di questo garbo, e con mi-
rar tante anatomie manco l’intendiamo. 
Ora se noi ignoriamo noi stessi e la fabbrica del corpo nostro e il reggimento, perché non 
sappiamo come lo moviamo, se va tra nervi lo spirito o facoltà, donde nasca il moto, come 
ridemo e piangemo e pensiamo, poiché tante questioni si fanno di questo, dunque resta a dire 
che altro guidi noi a fabbricare il corpo, e così l’anima de’ bruti e dele piante da altri è guida-
ta, e che ogni anima stia in corpo come cieca e all’oscuro, sì che non vede se stessa né le sue 
opere» (Emphasis mine).
42 Ibid., p. 99: «Senza dubbio la prima sapienza, mente altissima d’ogni cosa, per eminenza è 
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Campanella could ascribe knowledge of their goals, and may be also 
of the means for reaching it,43 to falling stones and upward-aiming fire, 
merely stressing their aiming at a goal. But the case of human body’ move-
ments is harder because human soul knows that it does not know what 
is required to perform the movements of its body and to reach its goals: 
«I am amazed at the ingenuity of the human being, whose soul governs 
the body without knowing how it does so». That is why, reflecting on the 
problem raised by Galen, Campanella surprisingly accepts the conclusions 
he disliked so much when argued by Aquinas or Biel: «[first wisdom] does 
everything as the principal agent, and any other agent is a tool of his», be-
ing satisfied with the immanence of divine wisdom. And Campanella, the 
bravest defender of the autonomy of nature as opposed to divine interfer-
ence, here quotes the Scriptures on behalf of divine causality in nature: 
«Wisely, Saint Jerome ascribes to God the creation of a human being in 
the womb, and thus the Maccabean woman says to her children, “I know 
neither how to make human beings, nor how you turned up in my womb”, 
because surely it is the first, universal cause, and not a particular one, that 
more certainly has effect».44 Body’s movements and embryology are linked 
together once more, in focusing the problem originally raised by Galen. 
Malebranche would later use the same scriptural quote to argue for Oc-
casionalism, against the power attributed to nature, this dangerous idol 
«of Aristotle and the Peripatetic school», and, we may add, of Campanella 
himself.45 This amazing alliance is the consequence of the shared principle 
following which an intelligence is at work in any natural event. 
5. Pierre Chanet and animal instinct
In 1643, about twenty years before the publication of Geulincx’s Ethi-
ca, Pierre Chanet, a physician, published his Considérations sur la Sagesse 
dentro a tutte le cose, e tutte le cose sono in lei; e senza moversi è velocissima, camina da fine a fine 
del tutto, e ogni cosa opera come principale agente, e ogni agente è suo in strumento […]».
43 Ibid., p. 18: «Dio […] non tira al fine se non con l’istesse nature, imprimendo virtù, 
non solo d’andare al fine, ma di saper andare […]» (Emphasis mine).
44 Ibid., p. 100: «Dunque saviamente san Gieronimo attribuisce a Dio la composizione 
dell’uomo nell’utero, e così quella donna maccabea disse. “Io non so lavorare uomini, né come 
nel mio ventre siante comparsi” (2 Macc 7, 22), parlando ai figluoli, perché invero alla causa 
universale e principale con più certezza convien l’effetto che alla particolare».
45 MalEbranchE, Eclaircissement XV, cit., p. 239: «Elle ne dit pas comme Aristote et 




de Charron in Paris. Chanet’s target is in the pages Charron dedicates to 
animal intelligence, following Montaigne. Against Charron, Chanet argues 
that animal instinct does not indicate a form of intelligence in the ani-
mal itself. But Chanet does not at all deny that instinctive animal actions 
show intelligence. On the contrary, the very perfection of instinctive ac-
tions, never uncertain, independent of training and experience, shows that 
their performance requires much more intelligence than what an animal 
can have. It is necessary to deny reason to animals because their actions 
show too much of it. Certainly, instinctive actions have an aim, as Aquinas 
understood, and any aim is backed by an intelligent and conscious de-
sign; but all of nature, including animals, is without that intelligence and 
is therefore an unconscious tool, ignorant of the goal it aims at, like the 
arrow the archer shoots. To deprive animals of reason, Chanet resorted 
to Aquinas’ arrow: 
order is an outcome of reason […]. Therefore this reason, which does not exist 
in insensitive beings, must be provided from some other source, and these beings 
must be led by some other, nobler principle, which knows their goal and knows 
how to pursue it. Those beings behave like an arrow, which never falls short of 
its target. Since the arrow heads confidently towards its target, as if it saw it, we 
are forced to believe it is carried and driven by someone who sees the target and 
knows how to lead the arrow there.46
As a consequence, in instinctive goal-directed actions God is the only 
cause: «in instinctive actions the first cause alone acts in what concerns 
driving and directing other causes to their goal».47 
However, Chanet includes in the category of instinct not only animal’s 
actions but all body movements and all actions that look as demanding a 
knowledge that the presumed agent does not possess. As a result, actions 
of human beings too lose their specificity. Indeed, fetus’ formation in the 
womb of the mother, as moving a hand at will, are included in the cat-
egory of ‘instinct’.48 In this case, to the arrow shot at its target by some-
one else, Chanet adds something which was not in Aquinas, but which, 
in tune with the request for an intelligent mind guiding nature, came to 
Chanet, the physician, from his colleague Galen: one who does not know 
46 P. ChanEt, Considérations sur la Sagesse de Charron en deux parties, Paris, C. Le Groult 
1643, p. 74.
47 Ibid., pp. 62-63.
48 Ibid., pp. 66 and 84.
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how an effect is produced cannot cause it; hence, when an effect is pro-
duced without knowledge of how to produce it, the agent is not the one 
who seems to be its proximal cause. Human voluntary actions, then, also 
require an external agent: 
Certainly, we move our hands thanks to our imagination, which stirs and 
drives the faculty to move which is in all muscles. But these muscles are so nu-
merous, and their arrangement so intricate, that, in most cases, the most clev-
er anatomists have difficulty discerning which muscles perform each particular 
movement, and they often make mistakes, notwithstanding their scrupulousness. 
Yet, the most ignorant people, those who have never heard talk of muscles or 
nerves and who do not know that either of them exist, nonetheless do not re-
frain from any particular movement or from making all their muscles act. Hence, 
I would ask the foes of instinct where such confident behavior derives from in 
this faculty which the schools call ‘locomotive’ […]. Someone will reply that it 
is nature which directs it. But that is the reply of the ignorant, who speaks of 
nature in general, without pointing to any specific faculty […]. Our soul can 
know and discern the muscles only through the senses or reason. Since the soul 
of men who have not learned anatomy is not acquainted with them neither by 
senses nor by reason, it is evident that it doesn’t know them at all. Not knowing 
nor discerning them at all, it is necessary that it is guided by another power who 
knows them, and this is what we call instinct.49 
Clearly, Chanet partakes of the line of thought which Galen started, 
even echoing Galen’s contempt towards those who refer to ‘nature’ to 
account for instinctive movements. Notably, Chanet interlaces the argu-
ment according to which any goal-oriented behavior needs an intelligent 
cause and the epistemic condition for causality. As Galen and Campanella 
before him, Chanet is an excellent witness of the common conceptual ori-
gin of these arguments that resort to God for explaining natural events. 
Moreover, by Chanet, the argument originating in Aquinas according to 
which any goal-oriented behavior requires an intelligent cause strikes out 
mainly at the causal capacity of animals, beings allegedly not intelligent, 
whereas the resumption of the epistemic condition for causality strikes 
a blow above all at human actions. Indeed, men know better their own 
faculties than animal’s ones. Moreover, the human soul knows that it does 
not know what is required to perform the movements of his body. That 
is why the argument that will be referred to as Quod nescis has its first 
49 Ibid., pp. 64-66 (Emphasis mine).
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and preferred application to human behavior, overcoming the eventual 
pretence that nature and animals could know the means by which their 
actions are performed.50 A pretence that Campanella, as we have seen, 
was inclined to advance.51
A comparison between this text of Chanet’s and Malebranche’s Search 
after truth, quoted above,52 leads to suspect, furthermore, that Chanet’s 
text, rather than Geulincx, may have been the proximal source of Male-
branche’s assumption of the Quod nescis principle.53 
6. Occasionalism against Descartes
Now we can ask ourselves about Descartes’ position regarding the 
problem set by Galen. Descartes is the philosopher who identifies the 
essence of the Self with thought, and thought with consciousness; hence 
Galen’s argument concerns him more than anyone else. How is it pos-
sible to ascribe to the conscious mind causation of body phenomena 
which the mind does not know how to produce? Arnauld raises the point: 
«This is what I have understood from your principles: only that which we 
consciously experience as thought is the work of the mind, which is by 
nature thought. But if animal spirits in the nerves flow this or that way, 
this happens without thought or awareness, and therefore it seems that it 
50 Ibid., pp. 66-68: «De fait il n’y a point d’homme si brutal, qui ayant veu les enfans nais-
sans approchans du sein de leurs nourrices, n’ait admiré l’instinct, qui leur ouvre la bouche, et 
leur fait apres reserrer pour succer le laict, avec tant d’artifice, qu’il y a des hommes faits qui 
s’y trouveroient bien empeschez. […] Il faut avoir l’esprit mal fait pour ne reconnoistre pas, 
que ce n’est pas une connoissance qui leur soit propre, qui les porte à cela, et qu’il faut qu’ils 
y soient conduits par une plus grande sagesse que la leur. […] Quelqu’un dira que les bestes 
qui viennent de naistre sont autant à admirer. Ce que j’avoue estre veritable, et c’est un de nos 
argumens pour l’instinct; mais il n’est pas si evident que celui que nous tirons de l’alaitement 
des enfans, pource que nous connoissons mieux l’estat et les facultez de l’ame d’un enfant, que 
nous ne faisons celles des bestes. Nous sçavons bien que nous venons au monde sans y apporter 
aucune connoissance, que les sens ne nous en ont encore point fourny, et que nous ne nous 
servons pas de nostre raison. Au lieu que nos Adversaires seroient bien assez hardis pour nous 
asseurer que les bestes raisonnent dès leur naissance» (Emphasis mine).
51 See supra, note 43. 
52 Supra, p. 000.
53 The library of Malebranche contained two texts by Marin Cureau de La Chambre, who 
was engaged in a long dispute with Pierre Chanet about the knowledge of animals. Cfr. MalE-
branchE, OC, XX, pp. 260-261. Moreover, Chanet was a philosopher well known in Cartesian 
circles. La Forge quotes Chanet’s Traité de l’Esprit de l’Homme et de ses fonctions in his Traité 
de l’esprit de l’homme, cit., p. 153 and passim.
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cannot be the product of the mind».54 Arnauld deems the Cartesian iden-
tification of thought with consciousness to be one more problem in the 
interaction between mind and body, in the spirit of the questions posed 
by Galen; if mind and consciousness are identical, if the mind does not 
know how animal spirits flow in the nerves, the mind cannot make the 
animal spirits move.
Descartes replies the following: «True, we are not aware of how our 
mind makes animal spirits flow in these nerves or in those others […]. 
Nevertheless, we are aware of any action by which the mind makes the 
nerves move, because this action is in the mind: in the mind this action is, 
in fact, a proclivity of the will towards this or that movement. The flow-
ing of spirit in the nerves and everything that is required to produce that 
movement are a consequence of this proclivity of the will, and this is be-
cause of the apt arrangement of the body, which the mind may not know, 
and also because of the union of mind and body, of which the mind is cer-
tainly aware».55 That is, Descartes explicitly denies that knowledge of how 
our body movements are produced is necessary to ascribe their causation 
to the mind. The causality of the mind depends on the will: the ways in 
which the body satisfies its commands are determined by body structure, 
of which the mind, without losing efficacy, has no knowledge.
Descartes’ position is not surprising, since his whole physical and 
metaphysical project opposes the metaphysical framework within which 
Galen’s question can be posed. As everybody knows, Descartes’ expla-
nation of how the world is formed is meant as a break with the Renaiss-
sance view of the divinity of nature: «Here, by nature I do not mean a 
54 Arnauld to Descartes, July 1648, in R. DEScartES, Oeuvres, éd. par Ch. aDam et P. 
TannEry (AT), V: Correspondance. Mai 1647 - février 1650, Paris 1974, p. 215: «Uno verbo, 
quantum ex tuis principiis colligere potui, id solum fit à mente nostra, quae natura sua cogi-
tatio est, quod fit cogitantibus atque advertentibus nobis; at quod spiritus animales hoc vel 
illo modo in nervos dirigantur, id non fit cogitantibus atque adevrtentibus nobis: non ergo à 
mente nostra fieri videtur».
55 Descartes to Arnauld, 29 July 1648, in AT, V, pp. 221-222: «Verum autem est, nos non 
esse conscios illius modi, quo mens nostra spiritus animales in hos vel illos vervos immittit […] 
sumus tamen conscii omnis eius actionis per quam mens nervos movet, quatenus talis actio est 
in mente, quippe in qua nihil aliud est, quam inclinatio voluntatis ad hunc vel illum motum; 
atque hanc volutantis inclinationem sequuntur spirituum in nervos influxus, et reliqua, quae 
ad istum motum requiruntur; hocque propter aptam corporis configurationem, quam mens 
potest ignorare, ac etiam propter mentis cum corpore unionem, cuius sane mens conscia est; 
alioquin enim ad membra movenda voluntatem suam non inclinaret» (Emphasis mine). See D. 
kolESnik-antoinE, Les occasionalismes en France à l’âge classique. Le ‘cas’ arnaldien, «Revue 




divinity, or any other kind of imaginary power. I use the term for matter 
itself».56 Against Renaissance vitalism, Descartes certainly did not intend 
to go back to the role ascribed to God by the Platonized Aristotelianism 
of the Schoolmen. Descartes goes beyond the alternative which dominat-
ed the philosophy of nature in accounting for world order. This order is 
produced by efficient causes and by the laws of body movements; final 
causes have no role in his explanation of physics.57 With the absence of te-
leology the demand for an intelligence able to account for regular natural 
phenomena also disappears. Nature is the set of particular and different 
movements which occur because of the colliding of bodies unintended 
by God.58 Mechanical arrangements of its parts, as De homine tries to 
demonstrate, explain human body’s functions, too. Descartes’ tale of the 
world and his biological researches develop in opposition to both the 
divinity of nature and to a plan of divine intelligence, by-passing the al-
ternatives of the schoolmen’s Platonized Aristotelianism and Renaissance 
divine nature. The Quod nescis principle, instead, sprang from and grew 
on the problematic grounds Descartes wanted to leave behind.59 That 
Descartes was wholly alien to the problems posed by Galen is confirmed 
in his philosophical discussion on animal behavior, which Descartes had 
touched on already in his Discourse on Method, maintaining, as is well 
known, that animals have no sensibility.60
Among the many notable elements in Chanet’s work there is an ab-
sence, a void. Chanet never mentions Descartes, simply ignoring him, 
giving neither a hint nor a single quote. Still, Descartes himself, in his 
56 R. DEScartES, Le monde, in AT, XI, pp. 36-37.
57 R. DEScartES, Meditationes de prima philosophia, in AT, VII, pp. 5523-26.
58 R. DEScartES, Le Monde, in AT, XI, p. 377-12.
59 I do not know whether the anonymous critic of Darwin was conscious of quoting and 
reversing the Quod nescis principle when he wrote, in 1868: «In the theory with which we 
have to deal, Absolute Ignorance is the artificer; so that we may enunciate as the fundamental 
principle of the whole system, that in order to make a perfect and beautiful machine it is not 
requisite to know how to make it». Cfr. [M. R. BEvErly], The Darwinian Theory of the Trans-
mutation of Species Examined by a Graduate of the University of Cambridge, London, James 
Nisbet & Co, 1867, p. 295. Darwin certainly comes at the end of a process of explaining the 
order of nature without intelligent design in which Descartes has an important place. Daniel 
C. Dennett quotes the passage by the above mentioned critic of Darwin in Atheism and Evolu-
tion, in The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, ed. by M. Martin, Cambridge 2007, pp. 135-
148. Surprisingly, Dennett ranks Descartes among the philosophers who argue proof of God’s 
existence «from design».
60 For a critical review of the literature on this Cartesian topics see M. T. MarcialiS, 
Sensibilità e automatismo negli animali-macchina cartesiani, «Rivista di storia della filosofia», 
LXVI, 2011, pp. 603-631.
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Discourse on the Method, presents his view of animal-machines as a good 
antidote against Montaigne. Descartes and Chanet have the same ene-
my, libertine thought, which made animal intelligence central to an anti-
Christian strategy. But sharing an enemy does not make for an alliance. 
Descartes and Chanet fear two very different aspects of Montaigne’s and 
Charron’s libertine thought: Descartes’ concern is that the animal intel-
ligence thesis might cast doubt on the immortality of the human soul; 
Chanet fears that this thesis might make nature autonomous in relation to 
God’s actions. Consequently, their strategies in opposing libertine thought 
are radically different. Descartes deprives animals of sensibility, and hence 
of a soul, and as a consequence their mortality is not an argument to 
doubt the immortality of the human soul. Instead, Chanet has no prob-
lem in letting animals have sensibility, but aims at bringing entirely back 
to God the causation of instinctive actions, both animal and human. Ac-
cording to Chanet, animal instinct is an episode in the struggle between 
nature and God, whereas according to Descartes animal instinct is critical 
only in relation to the question of animals having an incorporeal mind.
The debate on animal behavior offers a further argument to measure 
how extraneous the Quod nescis principle was to the Cartesian vision. Des-
cartes aims to deprive animals of sensibility, and hence of any form of con-
scious thinking, even the most elementary, such as feeling cold or hunger. 
Descartes’ argument rests on the thesis that movements in animal bodies 
can be produced independently of any sensibility or intelligence, exactly like 
in machines. That is, the animal-machine theory is possible only if the Quod 
nescis principle does not hold. Chanet’s thesis according to which instinctive 
animal and human actions are God’s work rests on the claim that all body 
movements require intelligence, i. e. on the claim that the principle holds.
In conclusion, Geulincx has merged an alien element into Cartesian-
ism, arising from a set of ideas against which Descartes had built his 
physics and his biology. We should not forget that Geulincx was first of 
all an Augustinian and hence a Platonist.
On the other hand, the Platonic line in physics which Galen started 
could have undergone a further check by Descartes himself. At least, this 
must have been what Clerselier felt or planned for when, having in his 
hands Descartes’ manuscript entitled La Description du Corps humain, 
he decided to add a second title: De la formation du foetus.61 Perhaps, 
61 See the critical note by Charles Adam in AT, XI, pp. 219-222. The title may have been 
inspired by the ‘digression’ added by Descartes to La Description du Corps humain. But the 
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Clerselier was aware that the biology and the references to embryology 
that Descartes had left unfinished offered the best answer to the ques-
tions posed by Galen’s text on the formation of the fetus, obstructing the 
animistic and theological approaches which that text had suggested.62 For 
sure, Galen much more than Aristotle could have been the target of the 
following remark: 
The soul can excite a movement in the body only if the limbs required for 
this movement are well disposed. Instead, when all limbs are well disposed for 
any movement, the body doesn’t need the soul for producing it.63
If Clerselier’s, in choosing a title of the unfinished Cartesian’s work, 
aimed at emphasizing the opposition of Cartesian biology to Galen’s em-
bryological essay, the sequel to the story of Cartesianism would have bit-
terly disappointed him.
title given by Descartes to this digression would have been De la Formation de l’animal. Ibid., 
p. 219.
62 In the second paragraph, in the Description du Corps humain, Descartes claims that ig-
norance of anatomy and of body’s mechanic complexity concurred to fuel the bias according to 
which only a soul would explain body’s complex movements. As we know, in the treatise on the 
foetus formation, Galen ascribed to ignorance of anatomy and of body’s mechanic complexity 
that physiologists hadn’t previously searched for the intellectual principle presiding over body 
functions. Descartes’ text should have looked to Clerselier a downright retort to Galen’s argu-
ment. See AT, XI, p. 224: «Mais pource que nous avons tous éprouvé, dés nostre enfance, que 
plusieurs de ses mouvemens obëissoient à la volonté, qui est une des puissances de l’ame, cela 
nous a disposez à croire que l’ame est le principe de tous. A quoy aussi a beaucoup contribué 
l’ignorance de l’Anatomie et des Mechaniques: car ne considerans rien que l’exterieur du corps 
humain, nous n’avons point imaginé qu’il eust en soy assez d’organes, ou de ressors, pour se 
mouvoir de soy-mesme, en autant de diverses façons que nous voyons qu’il se meut».
63 Ibid., p. 224 (Emphasis mine).
